Formal verification of side-channel countermeasures using self-composition
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Formal Verification of Side-channel Countermeasures via Elementary Circuit Transformations
We describe a technique to formally verify the security of masked implementations against side-channel attacks, based on elementary circuit transforms. We describe two complementary approaches: a generic approach for the formal verification of any circuit, but for small attack orders only, and a specialized approach for the verification of specific circuits, but at any order. We also show how t...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Science of Computer Programming
سال: 2013
ISSN: 0167-6423
DOI: 10.1016/j.scico.2011.10.008