Formally proved security of assembly code against power analysis
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Formally Proved Security of Assembly Code Against Leakage
In his keynote speech at CHES 2004, Kocher advocated that sidechannel attacks were an illustration that formal cryptography was not as secure as it was believed because some assumptions (e.g., no auxiliary information is available during the computation) were not modeled. This failure is due to the fact that formal methods work with models rather than implementations. Of course, we can use form...
متن کاملanalysis of power in the network society
اندیشمندان و صاحب نظران علوم اجتماعی بر این باورند که مرحله تازه ای در تاریخ جوامع بشری اغاز شده است. ویژگیهای این جامعه نو را می توان پدیده هایی از جمله اقتصاد اطلاعاتی جهانی ، هندسه متغیر شبکه ای، فرهنگ مجاز واقعی ، توسعه حیرت انگیز فناوری های دیجیتال، خدمات پیوسته و نیز فشردگی زمان و مکان برشمرد. از سوی دیگر قدرت به عنوان موضوع اصلی علم سیاست جایگاه مهمی در روابط انسانی دارد، قدرت و بازتولید...
15 صفحه اولUpdates on the Security of FPGAs Against Power Analysis Attacks
This paper reports on the security of cryptographic algorithms implemented on FPGAs against power analysis attacks. We first present some improved experiments against these reconfigurable devices, due to an improved measurement process. Although it is usually believed that FPGAs are noisy targets for such attacks, it is shown that simple power consumption models can nearly perfectly correlate w...
متن کاملSide-Effect Analysis of Assembly Code
In this paper we present a light-weight interprocedural side-effect analysis on assembly code. We represent the modifying potential of a procedure f by classifying all write accesses, occurring within f , relative to the parameter registers. In particular our approach is the first to accurately handle reference parameters. We demonstrate the usefulness of this approach by integrating this analy...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Cryptographic Engineering
سال: 2015
ISSN: 2190-8508,2190-8516
DOI: 10.1007/s13389-015-0105-2