Forming Buyer Coalition Scheme with Connection of a Coalition Leader
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Forming Buyer Coalition Scheme with Connection of a Coalition Leader
Despite the variety of existing theoretical models for buyers’ coalition in the current e-commerce literature, no existing coalition scheme explicitly takes into consideration issues related to the leadership attributes of the coalition. By adopting a design science research methodology and utilizing theoretical groundings of the Social Networking and Game theory, the current article provides a...
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Coalition stability is a major requirement in coalition formation. One important problem to achieve stability in n-person game theories is the assumption that the preference of each buyer is publicly known. The coalition is said to be stable if there are no objection by any subset of buyers according to their publicly known preferences. However, such assumption is often unrealistic in typical r...
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This paper surveys and analyzes the state of the art of buyer coalition mechanisms, paying attention to single item and bundle of items aspects. From the exits buyer coalition schemes, the solution concepts of their mechanisms are concerned with are related to both cooperative and non-cooperative game theory. Finally, we conclude by discussing the future directions of buyer coalition mechanisms.
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The study of the buyer coalition has been reviewed by researchers for decades. However, there are few schemes applying ant colony optimization (ACO) for forming buyer coalition. In this paper, the approach called the Ant Colony for Buyer Coalition (ACBC) algorithm is proposed to form the buyer coalition with bundles of items. The main endeavor of the algorithm is to partition the whole group of...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of theoretical and applied electronic commerce research
سال: 2012
ISSN: 0718-1876
DOI: 10.4067/s0718-18762012000100009