Foundations for contest success functions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Parametric Contest Success Functions
The key element of models of contest is the Contest Success Function (CSF) which specifies the winning probabilities of agents. We provide an axiomatization of two parametric families of CSF’s. In the first, the winning probability of each agent depends on the investments and a vector of parameters, where each parameter is specific to one of the contestants. In the second, the winning probabili...
متن کاملGeneralized Contest Success Functions
The key element of models of contest is the Contest Success Function (CSF) which specifies the winning probabilities of agents. The existing axiomatizations of CSFs assume that contestants can make only one type of investment. This paper generalizes these axiomatizations to the case where each agent can have multiple types of investments. This allows us to provide a unified framework to extend ...
متن کاملContest functions: Theoretical foundations and issues in estimation
Contest functions (alternatively, contest success functions) determine probabilities of winning and losing as a function of contestants e¤ort. They are used widely in many areas of economics that employ contest games, from tournaments and rent-seeking to conict and sports. We rst examine the theoretical foundations of contest functions and classify them into four types of derivation: stochas...
متن کاملA contest success function for networks
This paper models conflict within a network of friendships and enmities between players. We assume that each player is either in a friendly or in an antagonistic relation with every other player and players compete for a fixed prize by exerting costly efforts. We axiomatically characterize a success function which determines the share of each player given the efforts and the network of relation...
متن کاملRelative difference contest success function
In this paper, we present a contest success function (CSF), which is homogeneous of degree zero and in which the probability of winning the prize depends on the relative difference of efforts. In a simultaneous game with two players, we present a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. This equilibrium is unique and interior. This condition does...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economic Theory
سال: 2008
ISSN: 0938-2259,1432-0479
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-008-0425-x