Founding Family Firms, CEO Incentive Pay, and Dual Agency Problems
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Founding family ownership , stock market returns , and agency problems
This paper explores the relationship between founding family ownership and stock market returns. Using the entire population of non-financial firms listed on the Swiss stock market for 2003–2013, we find that the stock returns of family firms are significantly higher than those of non-family firms after adjusting the returns for different risk factors and firm characteristics. Family firms gene...
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s We examine the relation between founding family and corporate investment policy through the incentives of CEO compensation in a structural framework. We focus on two pay sensitivities, delta and vega, which motivate managerial efforts and risk-taking behavior, respectively. We find that vega is lowest and delta is highest in active family firms despite no significant differences in both measu...
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This article examines founding family influence on pay-out policies for Swiss listed firms over the period 2003-2010. We find that founding family firms have higher dividends and total pay-outs than non-family firms. There is no significant difference between stock repurchases for the two types of firms. We show that specific firm characteristics such as active involvement of family members, th...
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We investigate the impact of founding family ownership structure on the agency cost of debt. We find that founding family ownership is common in large, publicly traded firms and is related, both statistically and economically, to a lower cost of debt financing. Our results are consistent with the idea that founding family firms have incentive structures that result in fewer agency conflicts bet...
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We analyze several proposals to restrict CEO compensation and calibrate two models of executive compensation that describe how rms would react to dierent types of restrictions. We nd that many restrictions would have unintended consequences. Restrictions on total realized (ex-post) payouts lead to higher average compensation, higher rewards for mediocre performance, lower risk-taking incentives...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Small Business Management
سال: 2016
ISSN: 0047-2778
DOI: 10.1111/jsbm.12237