Fraudulent financial reporting detection: Corporate governance red flags
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Corporate Ownership and Control
سال: 2007
ISSN: 1810-3057,1727-9232
DOI: 10.22495/cocv4i4c2p1