Free choice permission, legitimization and relating semantics

نویسندگان

چکیده

Abstract In this paper, we apply relating semantics to the widely discussed problem of free choice between permitted actions or situations in normative systems. Leaving aside contexts which principle is obviously unacceptable (weak permission understood as an absence prohibition) uncontroversially valid (strong within systems with a closed repertoire situations), concentrate on for explicit permissions. order construct formal representation permissions, introduce special constant, $\texttt {permit}$, analogous constant {violation}$ used Andersonian–Kangerian approach deontic logic respect prohibition and obligation. Consequently, define operator basis {permit}$ relation legitimization. The general idea that $P \varphi $ true if only true, means actually issued $\varphi legitimized by {permit}$. intuitive notion legitimization formally represented implication: non-classical implication semantically defined adding constraint classical meaning effect arguments are related relation. properties based informal, determine operator. We show resulting possesses property avoids certain unwanted consequences follow from alternative approaches.

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Logic Journal of the IGPL

سال: 2022

ISSN: ['1367-0751', '1368-9894']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/jigpal/jzac047