Free Riding on Altruism and Group Size
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Group size and free riding when private and public goods are gross substitutes *
Using the traditional model of voluntary public good provision, it is shown that an expansion of group size exacerbates free riding tendencies as long as private consumption and the public good are strictly normal and weak gross substitutes. This result generalizes a previous Cobb–Douglas example with respect to preferences and asymmetric equilibria. 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights rese...
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An extensive analysis of user traffic on Gnutella shows a significant amount of free riding in the system. By sampling messages on the Gnutella network over a 24-hour period, we established that 70% of Gnutella users share no files, and 90% of the users answer no queries. Furthermore, we found out that free riding is distributed evenly between domains, so that no one group contributes significa...
متن کاملFree Riding on Gnutella
extensive analysis of user traffic on Gnutella shows a significant amount of free riding in the system. By sampling messages on the Gnutella network over a 24-hour period, we established that almost 70% of Gnutella users share no files, and nearly 50% of all responses are returned by the top 1% of sharing hosts. Furthermore, we found out that free riding is distributed evenly between domains, s...
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This article analyzes an asymmetric rent-seeking contest with free riding where valuation on the prize (rent) and effectiveness of rent-seeking effort may differ among agents and the victory of an agent may not exclude some agents other than the winner of the contest to consume the prize of the contest. After proving the unique existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, this article examines ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Public Economic Theory
سال: 2002
ISSN: 1097-3923,1467-9779
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9779.00101