Freerolls and binds: making policy when information is missing
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
RePEc Archive Monetary policy decision - making when information search is costly
This paper explores monetary policy decision-making within an insurance model with expected utility-maximizing policy-makers. The authors consider that policy-makers are different in terms of their backgrounds, experience and skills and they may disagree on the appropriate policy response. In a monetary policy committee, they share information and decide on interest rates by means of an agreed ...
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Theory: The political information that lobbyists seek is distributed in a communications network. Individual lobbyists must therefore choose their contacts carefully. We wed rational choice theory to network analysis in a combinatorial optimization model of lobbyists’ choice of contacts in a network. The model demonstrates the growing importance of political "friends" relative to acquaintances ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Behavioural Public Policy
سال: 2020
ISSN: 2398-063X,2398-0648
DOI: 10.1017/bpp.2020.51