Fuzzy Modeling for International Cooperative Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Japan Society for Fuzzy Theory and Systems
سال: 1993
ISSN: 0915-647X,2432-9932
DOI: 10.3156/jfuzzy.5.3_577