Games Bargaining: A Proposed Application of the Theory of Games to Collective Bargaining

Games Bargaining: A Proposed Application of the Theory of Games to Collective Bargaining

Transfer of Bargaining Power Sources in Oil Trade Games

Bargaining Power is one of the important issues in oil trade negotiations. In this paper two effective factors in bargaining power i.e. patient time to deal and outside options of each player have been considered. The necessary relations for exchange of sources in negotiation have been derived.

To “ a Theory of Disagreement in Repeated Games with Bargaining ”

THEOREM 9: For each i, let a be a pure action profile in the stage game. If aii is a best response to ai−i for both i and (π2 −π1) · (u(a2)− u(a1)) > 0, then the following two-state automaton strategy, with states 1 and 2, yields a BSG set for δ sufficiently high: • Disagreement: In state i, make no transfers and play a in the action phase. If player j = i deviates unilaterally, go to state j; ...

Coalitional bargaining games with random proposers: Theory and application

We consider a non-cooperative coalitional bargaining game with random proposers to bridge a gap between non-cooperative game theory and cooperative game theory. Theoretical results include the existence of a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium (SSPE) and the characterization of the grand-coalition SSPE as a generalized Nash bargaining solution, provided that it lies in the core. We also prov...

Markov Bargaining Games

I consider an alternating offer bargaining game which is played by a risk neutral buyer and seller, where the value of the good to be traded follows a Markov process. For these games the existence of a perfect equilibrium is proved and the set of equilibrium payoffs and strategies are characterised. The main results are: (a) If the buyer is less patient than the seller, then there will be delay...