Games of social interactions with local and global externalities
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Statistical physics approach to graphical games: local and global interactions
Abstract In a graphical game agents play with their neighbors on a graph to achieve an appropriate state of equilibrium. Here relevant problems are characterizing the equilibrium set and discovering efficient algorithms to find such an equilibrium (solution). We consider a representation of games that extends over graphical games to deal conveniently with both local a global interactions and us...
متن کاملSocial Interactions and Games
Digital games have become popular due to great technological improvements in recent years. They have been increasingly transformed from co-located experiences into multi-played, socially oriented platforms (Herodotou, 2009).Multi-User Online Games provide the opportunity to create a social environment for friendships and strengthen the relationships. However, several researchers supported the i...
متن کاملFinding Social Optima in Congestion Games with Positive Externalities
We consider a variant of congestion games where every player i expresses for each resource e and player j a positive externality, i.e., a value for being on e together with player j. Rather than adopting a game-theoretic perspective, we take an optimization point of view and consider the problem of optimizing the social welfare. We show that this problem is NP-hard even for very special cases, ...
متن کاملre in Games with Externalities
In the presence of externalities across coalitions, Dutta et al. (2010) characterize their value by extending Hart and Mas-Colell reduced game consistency. In the present paper, we provide a characterization result for the core for games with externalities by extending one form of consistency studied by Moulin (1985), which is often refereed to as the complement-reduced game property. Moreover,...
متن کاملSecurity Games with Protection Externalities
Stackelberg security games have been widely deployed in recent years to schedule security resources. An assumption in most existing security game models is that one security resource assigned to a target only protects that target. However, in many important real-world security scenarios, when a resource is assigned to a target, it exhibits protection externalities: that is, it also protects oth...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economics Letters
سال: 2011
ISSN: 0165-1765
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.01.012