Games with Imperfectly Observable Commitment
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Stochastic games with non-observable actions
We examine n-player stochastic games. These are dynamic games where a play evolves in stages along a finite set of states; at each stage players independently have to choose actions in the present state and these choices determine a stage payoff to each player as well as a transition to a new state where actions have to be chosen at the next stage. For each player the infinite sequence of his s...
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This paper explores how the ability to commit in games affect equilibrium payoffs. More precisely, we consider two-stage games, called commitment games, in which players can commit to some of their strategies in the first stage, and play the game induced by their commitment in the second stage. We completely characterize equilibrium payoffs of commitment games. Among others, we show that the po...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 1997
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1006/game.1997.0524