Games with Synergistic Preferences
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Games with Synergistic Preferences
In economic situations a player often has preferences regarding not only his or her own outcome but also regarding what happens to fellow players, concerns that are entirely apart from any strategic considerations. While this can be modeled directly by simply writing down a player’s final preferences, these are commonly unknown a priori. In many cases it is therefore both helpful and instructiv...
متن کاملFinitely repeated games with social preferences
A well—known result from the theory of finitely repeated games states that if the stage game has a unique equilibrium, then there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in the finitely repeated game in which the equilibrium of the stage game is being played in every period. Here I show that this result does in general not hold anymore if players have social preferences of the form frequently a...
متن کاملIncomplete Information Games with Smooth Ambiguity Preferences∗
We propose equilibrium notions for incomplete information games involving players who perceive ambiguity about the types of others. Players have smooth ambiguity preferences (Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji, 2005) and may be ambiguity averse. In the smooth ambiguity model it is possible to hold the agents’information fixed while varying the agent’s ambiguity attitude from aversion to neutralit...
متن کاملRepeated games with present-biased preferences
We study infinitely repeated games with observable actions, where players have present-biased (so-called β-δ) preferences. We give a two-step procedure to characterize Strotz-Pollak equilibrium payoffs: compute the continuation payoff set using recursive techniques, and then use this set to characterize the equilibrium payoff set U(β, δ). While Strotz-Pollak equilibrium and subgame perfection d...
متن کاملCoalition formation games with separable preferences
We provide sufficient conditions for the existence of stable coalitional structures in a purely hedonic game, that is in a coalition formation game such that players’ preferences over coalitions are completely determined by the members of the coalition to which they belong. First, we show that the existence of core stable and Nash stable solutions for the game depends on certain vector decompos...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games
سال: 2012
ISSN: 2073-4336
DOI: 10.3390/g3010041