GDP referrals

Referrals.

Specialization requires that workers deal with some valuable opportunities themselves and refer other, possibly unverifiable, opportunities to other workers. How do markets and organizations ensure the matching of opportunities with talent in the presence of informational asymmetries about their value? The cost of providing incentives for effort in this context is that they increase the risk of...

Selling Through Referrals∗

A seller has an object for sale and can reach buyers only through intermediaries, who also have privileged information about buyers’ valuations. Intermediaries can either mediate the transaction by buying the object and reselling it–the merchant model– or refer buyers to the seller and release information for a fee–the agency model. The merchant model suffers from double marginalization and the...

Dealing with extracontractual referrals.

OBJECTIVE To describe the mechanism established by Richmond, Twickenham, and Roehampton Health Authority to manage extracontractual referral requests made on behalf of its resident population and to examine its working in the first three months of the new arrangements. DESIGN Description of the procedures for managing extracontractual referrals and the decisions made on requests submitted to ...

Luis Garicano REFERRALS*

This paper studies the matching of opportunities with talent when costly diagnosis confers an informational advantage to the agent undertaking it. When this agent is under-qualified, adverse selection prevents efficient referrals through fixed-price contracts. Spot-market contracts that rely on income sharing can match opportunities with talent but induce a team-production problem which, if sev...

Reducing inappropriate ENT referrals.