General Conversion for Obtaining Strongly Existentially Unforgeable Signatures
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Generic Transformation to Strongly Unforgeable Signatures
Recently, there are several generic transformation techniques proposed for converting unforgeable signature schemes (the message in the forgery has not been signed yet) into strongly unforgeable ones (the message in the forgery could have been signed previously). Most of the techniques are based on trapdoor hash functions and all of them require adding supplementary components onto the original...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences
سال: 2008
ISSN: 0916-8508,1745-1337
DOI: 10.1093/ietfec/e91-a.1.94