General disequilibrium analysis with inside debt
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Macroeconomics
سال: 1999
ISSN: 0164-0704
DOI: 10.1016/s0164-0704(99)80007-x