General distribution of consumers in pure Hotelling games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
General distribution of consumers in pure Hotelling games
A pure Hotelling game is a competition between a finite number of players who select simultaneously a location in order to attract as many consumers as possible. In this paper, we study the case of a general distribution of consumers on a network generated by a metric graph. Because players do not compete on price, the continuum of consumers shop at the closest player’s location. Under regulari...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Game Theory
سال: 2018
ISSN: 0020-7276,1432-1270
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-018-0648-4