Generalized Agency Problems
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Nber Working Paper Series Generalized Agency Problems
Agency problems in economics virtually always entail self-interested agency exhibiting “insufficient” loyalty to principal. Social psychology also has a literature, mainly derived from work by Stanley Milgram, on issues of agency, but this emphasizes excessive loyalty – people undergoing a so-called “agentic shift” and forsaking rationality for loyalty to a legitimate principal, as when “loyal”...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2009
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1508763