Generalized Hamiltonian dynamics and chaos in evolutionary games on networks
نویسندگان
چکیده
We study the network replicator equation and characterize its fixed points on arbitrary graph structures for 2 × symmetric games. show a relationship between asymptotic behavior of existence an independent vertex set in also that complex cannot emerge This links property dynamical system with combinatorial property. contrast this by showing ordinary rock–paper–scissors (RPS) exhibits chaos 3-cycle general graphs ≥3 vertices RPS is generalized Hamiltonian system. stands stark to established fact does not exhibit standard dynamics or bimatrix dynamics, which equivalent one edge two (K2).
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Physica D: Nonlinear Phenomena
سال: 2022
ISSN: ['1872-8022', '0167-2789']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.physa.2022.127281