Generalized Permutahedra and Optimal Auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
We study a family of convex polytopes, called SIM-bodies, which were introduced by Giannakopoulos and Koutsoupias in 2018 to analyze so-called Straight-Jacket Auctions. First, we show that the SIM-bodies belong class generalized permutahedra. Second, prove an optimality result for Auctions among certain deterministic auctions. Third, employ computer algebra methods mathematical software explicitly determine optimal prices revenues.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SIAM Journal on Applied Algebra and Geometry
سال: 2022
ISSN: ['2470-6566']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1137/21m1441286