Generalized Vickrey Auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) Auctions
A VCG auction (named after their inventors Vickrey, Clarke, and Groves) is a generalization of the single-good, second price Vickrey auction to the case of a combinatorial auction (multiple goods, from which any participant can bid on each possible combination). We formalize in this entry VCG auctions, including tie-breaking and prove that the functions for the allocation and the price determin...
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In recent years auctions have become more and more important in the field of multiagent systems as useful mechanisms for resource allocation and task assignment. In many cases the Vickrey (second-price sealed-bid) auction is used as a protocol that prescribes how the individual agents have to interact in order to come to an agreement. We show that the Vickrey auction, despite its theoretical be...
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Descending price auctions are adopted for goods that must be sold quickly and in private values environments, for instance in flower, fish, and tobacco auctions. In this paper, we introduce ex post efficient descending auctions for two environments: multiple non-identical items and buyers with unit-demand valuations; and multiple identical items and buyers with non-increasing marginal values. O...
متن کاملVicious Strategies for Vickrey Auctions
"!# $% &$% ' ()$% " *$%+# -, . / & 0 "1 2*(0 34$ 2 * 5 / 6 6 $% & 37 28$% . 8 -$% 39 : ; 2 2* / < (= . ->? 5 $% / @" A B$C / ? ?D: * .>/ FEG 8( ,H+ ? 2 (;,H! I( J K 0 (K 0 +; / 2L M+; !# N OP 0 8( *( 2 5 / N 8 / . M Q .(; N ? $% ? R 5 $% / @0ST 0$C < , 37 L U / 5V TDW .> U X U * % T2 OK!8 (;O' *(; 8(0 $% ' $%+ C( ' "Y6 6 T Z (C 34! *( (; * 5X 8( ) U[ 6 M 3& C( $% / Z! *( (; * 5% 6 . 5 \ ( Z . 8...
متن کاملVickrey Auctions for Irregular Distributions
The classic result of Bulow and Klemperer [1] says that in a singleitem auction recruiting one more bidder and running the Vickrey auction achieves a higher revenue than the optimal auction’s revenue on the original set of bidders, when values are drawn i.i.d. from a regular distribution. We give a version of Bulow and Klemperer’s result in settings where bidders’ values are drawn from non-i.i....
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 1994
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.975873