Genuine Confirmation and Tacking by Conjunction
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Probability, Confirmation, and the Conjunction Fallacy
The conjunction fallacy has been a key topic in debates on the rationality of human reasoning and its limitations. Despite extensive inquiry, however, the attempt of providing a satisfactory account of the phenomenon has proven challenging. Here, we elaborate the suggestion (first discussed by Sides et al., 2001) that in standard conjunction problems the fallacious probability judgments experim...
متن کاملTheoretical note Probability, confirmation, and the conjunction fallacy
The conjunction fallacy has been a key topic in debates on the rationality of human reasoning and its limitations. Despite extensive inquiry, however, the attempt to provide a satisfactory account of the phenomenon has proved challenging. Here we elaborate the suggestion (first discussed by Sides, Osherson, Bonini, & Viale, 2002) that in standard conjunction problems the fallacious probability ...
متن کاملIs the conjunction fallacy tied to probabilistic confirmation?
Crupi, Fitelson, and Tentori (CFT, forthcoming) offer three conditions that constitute an attempted confirmation-theoretic explanation of the conjunction fallacy. I present experimental results to show that CFT’s conditions are neither necessary nor sufficient for the fallacy. There exist cases that do not meet their three conditions in which subjects still tend to commit the fallacy. Also, the...
متن کاملThe conjunction fallacy, confirmation, and quantum theory: comment on Tentori, Crupi, and Russo (2013).
The conjunction fallacy refers to situations when a person judges a conjunction to be more likely than one of the individual conjuncts, which is a violation of a key property of classical probability theory. Recently, quantum probability (QP) theory has been proposed as a coherent account of these and many other findings on probability judgment "errors" that violate classical probability rules,...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
سال: 2020
ISSN: 0007-0882,1464-3537
DOI: 10.1093/bjps/axy005