Geometrical regret matching: A new dynamics to Nash equilibrium
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Nash Equilibrium and Dynamics
Presented at the Opening Panel of the Conference in Honor of John Nash’s 80th Birthday at Princeton University in June 2008. Updated: October 2010. Center for the Study of Rationality, Institute of Mathematics, and Department of Economics, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. e-mail : [email protected] web page: http://www.ma.huji.ac.il/hart I have seen “nash equilibrium” in print, as if “nash” we...
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Article history: Received 4 October 2010 Available online 9 November 2010 JEL classification: C70 C72 C73
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: AIP Advances
سال: 2020
ISSN: 2158-3226
DOI: 10.1063/5.0012735