Global convergence in an overlapping generations model with two-sided altruism
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Learned Convention and Subgame Perfect Equilibrium in an Overlapping Generations Model with Two-Sided Altruism
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Evolutionary Economics
سال: 2017
ISSN: 0936-9937,1432-1386
DOI: 10.1007/s00191-017-0519-3