Global Nash Convergence of Foster and Young's Regret Testing
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Global Nash convergence of Foster and Young's regret testing
We construct an uncoupled randomized strategy of repeated play such that, if every player plays according to it, mixed action profiles converge almost surely to a Nash equilibrium of the stage game. The strategy requires very little in terms of information about the game, as players’ actions are based only on their own past payoffs. Moreover, in a variant of the procedure, players need not know...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2004
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.678622