Governance Complexities in Firms with Dual Class Shares
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Governance beyond Agency Theory : the Tale of Dual Class Firms
This paper attempts to investigate the theoretical underpinnings for the reasons why firms frequently adopt the dual class equity structure, i.e. a capital (or ownership) structure based on the issuance of shares with differential voting rights (DeAngelo et al. 1985). Such an ownership structure is justified by some researchers as a defensive structure adopted by the directors and managers of a...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Annals of Corporate Governance
سال: 2018
ISSN: 2381-6724,2381-6732
DOI: 10.1561/109.00000015