منابع مشابه
Governance, Trade, and Investment *
Imperfections in the rule of law create new problems of contractibility, in addition to the familiar one of unverifiability of information. Alternative social institutions for governance of property and contract arise but are also imperfect, and can interact well or poorly with the formal state institutions. Security of property and contract is especially problematic for foreign traders and inv...
متن کاملGood Governance and Trade Policy
2 Summary Economists generally argue that the level and structure of a country's own trade barriers, as well as the "quality" of its governance policies, such as regulations on foreign investment or bureaucratic "red tape" on commercial activity, will have a major influence on its economic growth and performance. However, a problem previously encountered in attempts to test these relations empi...
متن کاملInternational Saving, Investment and Trade
Feldstein and Horioka (Econ J 90:314–329, 1980) observed that saving and investment move closely together in the major OECD countries. This finding is a puzzle if national economies are characterized by one sector neoclassical production functions—with diminishing returns to capital, a high level of savings in a country should create an incentive to export capital. In this paper, we show that t...
متن کاملTrends in Trade and Investment Promotion Trade Promotion Organizations and Investment Promotion Agencies: are they merging?
PURPOSE This white paper addresses a burning question related to investment promotion and trade promotion synergies: Are Trade Promotion Organizations and Investment Promotion Agencies merging? In order to better understand Investment Promotion Agencies (IPAs) and if their services and goals present similarities with Trade Promotion Organizations (TPOs), this whitepaper identifies the four majo...
متن کاملAid Effectiveness, Governance and Public Investment
To analyze ways in which aid can be made more effective, we develop a growth model in which aid finances infrastructure investment and pro-poor spending. We assume that the recipient countries are aid-dependent in the early phase of development and ultimately become independent. In the model, donors can accelerate the independence of a recipient from aid by investing in infrastructure. We demon...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Research in Economics
سال: 2015
ISSN: 1090-9443
DOI: 10.1016/j.rie.2014.08.001