Governing Interest Groups and Rent Dissipation

Collusion Among Interest Groups: Foreign Aid and Rent-Dissipation

This paper develops a game-theoretic model of public policy in a developing country in order to explain a number of empirical regularities. It is shown that under certain circumstances, an increase in government revenue will be completely crowded out by increased rent dissipation, leaving the provision of public goods unaltered. In this model, there are two possible ways in which foreign aid ma...

Rent Dissipation in R&D Races

The literature on R&D races suggests that noncolluding firms invest excessively in R&D. We show that this result depends critically on the winner-take-all assumption. Although rents continue to be dissipated once the winner-take-all assumption is relaxed because firms in general fail to provide the optimal R&D effort, the mechanisms behind this rent dissipation change with the degree of patent ...

Incomplete Information and Rent Dissipation in Deterministic Contests

In a deterministic contest or all-pay auction, all rents are dissipated when information is complete and contestants are identical. As one contestant becomes “stronger”, that is, values the prize more, total expenditures are known to decrease monotonically. Thus, asymmetry among contestants reduces competition and rent dissipation. Recently, this result has been shown to hold for other, non-det...

Quantum Dissipation and Quantum Groups

We discuss the rôle of quantum deformation of Weyl-Heisenberg algebra in dissipative systems and finite temperature systems. We express the time evolution generator of the damped harmonic oscillator and the generator of thermal Bogolubov transformations in terms of operators of the quantum Weyl-Heisenberg algebra. The quantum parameter acts as a label for the unitarily inequivalent representati...

Market Rent Dissipation in Regulated Open Access Fisheries