Government Policy with Time Inconsistent Voters
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Government Policy with Time Inconsistent Voters
Behavioral economics presents a “paternalistic”rationale for benevolent government intervention. This paper presents a model of public debt where voters have self-control problems and attempt to commit by accumulating illiquid assets. We introduce politicians who may indulge/exploit voters’behavioral biases. Three main insights emerge: (i) Individuals’attempts to privately undo the consequences...
متن کاملFor Online Publication: Appendix for Government Policy with Time Inconsistent Voters
In this supplementary appendix, we study various extensions of the model in the paper. More specifically, in Section A we allow for election in the first period; in Section B we study the setting with arbitrary number of periods and convex distortions discussed in the body of the paper; in Section C we analyze a model analogous to the one presented in the paper in which agents are characterized...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2011
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2120954