Green Investment Decision and Coordination in a Retailer-Dominated Supply Chain Considering Risk Aversion
نویسندگان
چکیده
With the sustainable development of global economy, environmental problems and green economy are increasingly becoming points concern for community. However, large amount capital invested in technology high price products have become key hindering a risk-averse supply chain. In order to promote chain increase investment level, improve degree products, reduce impact risk aversion on investment, this paper studies two-echelon composed manufacturer risk-neutral retailer, which retailer is leader follower. We construct wholesale contract model, cost-sharing two-part respectively, use Optimization Theory Methods discuss three contracts degree, expected utility chain, retail price, consumer surplus, social welfare. The results show that contract, compared with product has been significantly improved, but enterprises cannot achieve Pareto improvement, higher awareness will cause manufacturer’s decline. tariff achieves highest contracts; more importantly, not related aversion; meanwhile, lowest among contracts, surplus welfare highest. Our main contribution eliminates influence above decision variable realizes unification manufacturers, retailers, consumers, benefits. Finally, uses numerical examples verify conclusions then analyzes sensitivity system.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Sustainability
سال: 2022
ISSN: ['2071-1050']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.3390/su142013606