Group activity selection problem with approval preferences
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Group Activity Selection Problem
We consider a setting where we have to organize one or several group activities for a group of agents. Each agent will participate in at most one activity; her preference over activities generally depends on the number of participants in the activity. The goal is to assign agents to activities in a desirable way. We give a general model, which is a natural generalization of anonymous hedonic ga...
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We consider the situation in which group activities need to be organized for a set of agents when each agent can take part in at most one activity. The agents' preferences depend both on the activity and the number of participants in that activity. In particular, the preferences are given by means of strict orders over such pairs (activity, group size), including the possibility " do nothing "....
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Suppose that a large number of individuals are randomly matched into groups where each group plays a finite symmetric game. Individuals breed true according to their individual material payoffs, but the expected number of surviving offspring may depend on the material payoff vector to the whole group. We show that the mean-field equation for the induced population dynamic is equivalent to the r...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Game Theory
سال: 2017
ISSN: 0020-7276,1432-1270
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-017-0596-4