Group (epistemic) competence

Abstract In this paper, I present an account of group competence that is explicitly framed for cases epistemic performances. According to it, we must consider as the agents’ capacity produce knowledge, and not result summation its individual members’ competences knowledge. Additionally, contend be understood in terms normative status. To introduce my view, Jesper Kallestrup’s (Synthese 1–19, 2016) denial involves anything over beyond aggregation competences. have divided response into two parts. First, compare conceptions from Ernest Sosa’s reliabilist virtue epistemology (Sosa Philos Stud 142:5–15, 2009; Perspect 24:465–475, 2010a; Knowing full well, Princeton University Press, 2010b; Judgment & agency, Oxford 2015; Epistemology, 2017; in: Silva-Filho, Tateo (eds), Thinking about oneself: The place value reflection philosophy psychology, Springer, 2019) David Löwenstein’s (Know-how competence. A Rylean responsibilist account, Vittorio Klostermann, 2017) know-how. Second, take results comparison apply them issue know-how, by hand Orestis Palermos Deborah Tollefsen’s twofold approach topic (Palermos Tollefsen, Carter, Clark, Kallestrup, Palermos, Pritchard (eds) Socially extended epistemology, 2018). Finally, return make point favour conception genuine status achieve success.