Group-Level Selection Increases Cooperation in the Public Goods Game
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Group-Level Selection Increases Cooperation in the Public Goods Game
When groups compete for resources, some groups will be more successful than others, forcing out less successful groups. Group-level selection is the most extreme form of group competition, where the weaker group ceases to exist, becoming extinct. We implement group-level selection in a controlled laboratory experiment in order to study its impact on human cooperation. The experiment uses variat...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: PLOS ONE
سال: 2016
ISSN: 1932-6203
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0157840