Group size and matching protocol in contests
نویسندگان
چکیده
We investigate the effects of group size and matching protocol in Tullock contest experiments. In a 2 × factorial design, we implement partner random stranger-matching protocols contests between two three players. Group does not affect overall absolute bid levels, but rate overbidding is lower two-player groups across protocols. Matching bidding behaviour for three-player groups, reduces both level dispersion bids groups. These results show joint effect suggest that identifiability repeated play facilitates tacit collusion. Taille du groupe et protocole d’association dans les concours. Dans cet article, nous étudions effets de la taille « d’appariement » (matching protocol) expériences relatives aux un plan factoriel x 2, mettons en œuvre des protocoles partenaires aléatoires d’inconnus pour concours entre deux trois joueurs. La n’a aucun effet sur le niveau global mises valeur absolue; néanmoins, d’un à l’autre, fréquence surenchères est plus faible lorsqu’il n’y que Le n’entraîne aucune répercussion quant comportements mise groupes joueurs; joueurs, présence partenaire réduit mises. Ces résultats montrent l’effet conjugué suggérant l’identifiabilité jeux répétés facilite collusion tacite. Please note: The publisher responsible content or functionality any supporting information supplied by authors. Any queries (other than missing content) should be directed to corresponding author article.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Canadian Journal of Economics
سال: 2021
ISSN: ['0008-4085', '1540-5982']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/caje.12557