HERDING WITH COSTLY INFORMATION
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Herding with Costly Information
We consider a standard sequential decision to adopt/buy a good in a herding environment. The setup is same as in Sgroi (2002). Contrary to the basic herding case we introduce a cost that the agents have to pay for the information about their predecessors’ actions. All agents receive informative signals as in the standard herding models but do not view the actions taken by their predecessors unl...
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We characterize optimal strategies in a simple herding model where observations have a small cost. We assume that there are two states and two possible signals that each agent may get. The prior distribution is biased towards adopting behavior. That is ex-ante adopting gives a higher expected utility than not adopting. Contrary to Kultti & Miettinen (2005) herding does not arise deterministical...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Game Theory Review
سال: 2006
ISSN: 0219-1989,1793-6675
DOI: 10.1142/s021919890600076x