Heterogeneity in independent non-executive directors' attributes and risk-taking in large banks

نویسندگان

چکیده

The extant literature suggests that complex firms can benefit from independent non-executive director (INED) quality. To address the issue of INED quality, we look at heterogeneity in directors' (INEDs') attributes and explore whether this is related to risk-taking behaviour large banks. We gather novel, hand-collected, director-level data for approximately 2400 directors (INEDs) 185 global banks 35 countries period 2004–2016, concluding INEDs' gender, financial expertise, board tenure all influence behaviour. Employing several identification strategies, show cause seems be attributes, as channelled through information asymmetry. also find significantly mitigates bank post-2009 period. Our study contributes on both benefits INEDs heterogeneity.

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Corporate Finance

سال: 2021

ISSN: ['0929-1199', '1872-6313']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2021.102074