Heterogeneous update mechanisms in evolutionary games: Mixing innovative and imitative dynamics

Heterogeneous Fundamentalists and Imitative Process

Developing a model with a switching mechanism, we show how complex dynamics can be generated even though heterogeneity arises among agents with the same trading rules (fundamentalists). We assume that there are two experts which are imitated by other operators. We show that (i) market instability and periodic, or even, chaotic price fluctuations can be generated; (ii) conditions exist under whi...

Evolutionary imitative dynamics with population-varying aspiration levels

We consider models of deterministic evolution in games with finite strategies in which populations of agents interact with themselves and with each other. All populations have a same set of strategies and an identical payoff function, but they differ in their imitative decision rules. We show that all the populations will have an identical distribution over strategies in the long run despite di...

Population Games And Evolutionary Dynamics

Evolutionary Games and Local Dynamics

Evolutionary games have been introduced by Maynard Smith and Price [1973] in the early 70’s with the aim to study the stability of populations in time. In the general model, a population consists of finitely many different types that interact randomly with each other, where each interaction leads to fitness payoffs for each of the types involved. Consequently, the population distribution over t...

Exploration dynamics in evolutionary games.

Evolutionary game theory describes systems where individual success is based on the interaction with others. We consider a system in which players unconditionally imitate more successful strategies but sometimes also explore the available strategies at random. Most research has focused on how strategies spread via genetic reproduction or cultural imitation, but random exploration of the availab...