Hidden action and outcome contractibility: An experimental test of moral hazard theory
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چکیده
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2018
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.02.006