HISTORY-INDEPENDENT PREDICTION IN EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
History Independent Prediction in Evolutionary Game Theory*
research interests include evolution and learning in games and the economics of technological standardization. Abstract We survey three classes of models from evolutionary game theory which make history independent predictions: stochastic stability, stochastic stability with local interaction, and cheap talk. We argue that of the three, only local interaction models yield credible history indep...
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Escort Evolutionary Game Theory
A family of replicator-like dynamics, called the escort replicator equation, is constructed using information-geometric concepts and generalized information entropies and diverenges from statistical thermodynamics. Lyapunov functions and escort generalizations of basic concepts and constructions in evolutionary game theory are given, such as an escorted Fisher’s Fundamental theorem and generali...
متن کاملEvolutionary Game Theory
Evolutionary game theory developed as a means to predict the expected distribution of individual behaviors in a biological system with a single species that evolves under natural selection. It has long since expanded beyond its biological roots and its initial emphasis on models based on symmetric games with a finite set of pure strategies where payoffs result from random one-time interactions ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Rationality and Society
سال: 1998
ISSN: 1043-4631,1461-7358
DOI: 10.1177/104346398010003002