Hodge decomposition and the Shapley value of a cooperative game
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Hodge decomposition and the Shapley value of a cooperative game
We show that a cooperative game may be decomposed into a sum of component games, one for each player, using the combinatorial Hodge decomposition on a graph. This decomposition is shown to satisfy certain efficiency, null-player, symmetry, and linearity properties. Consequently, we obtain a new characterization of the classical Shapley value as the value of the grand coalition in each player’s ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2019
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.09.006