Horizontal mergers and delegation

Strategic Delegation and Mergers in Oligopolistic Contests

In this paper, we combine the strategic delegation approach of FershtmanJudd-Sklivas with contests. The results show that besides a symmetric equilibrium there also exist asymmetric equilibria in which one owner induces pure sales maximization to his manager so that all the other firms drop out of the market. If merging is allowed on an initial stage, the resulting merged subgame perfect equili...

Horizontal Bank Mergers : Issues and

Horizontal mergers with free entry

We consider the impact of horizontal mergers in the presence of free entry and exit. In contrast to much of the previous literature on horizontal mergers, our model yields predictions that seem intuitively reasonable: with only moderate cost synergies mergers of a small number of industry participants are beneficial (even under quantity competition), there is no “free rider problem” in that ins...

Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis

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A dynamic model of endogenous horizontal mergers

an anonymous referee, and seminar participants at several institutions for helpful comments. I would like to thank the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation for financial support during the preparation of this paper. This paper is a revised version of parts of my doctoral dissertation.