Horizontal Product Differentiation: Disclosure and Competition
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Journal of Industrial Economics
سال: 2016
ISSN: 0022-1821
DOI: 10.1111/joie.12104