Horizontal Product Differentiation in Auctions and Multilateral Negotiations
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Horizontal Product Differentiation in Auctions and Multilateral Negotiations
Abstract: We experimentally compare first-price auctions and multilateral negotiations after introducing horizontal product differentiation into a standard procurement setting. Both institutions yield identical surplus for the buyer, a difference from prior findings with homogeneous products that results from differentiation’s influence on sellers’ pricing behavior. The data are consistent with...
متن کاملA Comparison of Auctions and Multilateral Negotiations
We compare the well-known first-price auction with a common but previously unexamined exchange process that we term “multilateral negotiations.” In multilateral negotiations, a buyer solicits price offers for a homogeneous product from sellers with heterogeneous costs, and then plays the sellers off one another to obtain additional price concessions. Using experimental methods, we find that tra...
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We use the experimental method to compare second-price auctions with verifiable multilateral negotiations in which the sole buyer can credibly reveal to sellers the best price offer he currently holds. Despite the two institutions seeming equivalence, we find that prices are lower in verifiable multilateral negotiations than in second-price auctions. The difference occurs because low-cost selle...
متن کاملMultilateral Ranking Negotiations
In general, negotiations within a group of participants are processes, that starting with participants in some arbitrary (initial) states eventually will achieve an agreement with all participants being in the required negotiated states. Process of negotiation is performed according to a negotiation protocol. Here, an ordering of participants is taken as the negotiation goal; constructing a neg...
متن کاملThe Effect of Offer Verifiability on the Relationship Between Auctions and Multilateral Negotiations
We use the experimental method to compare second-price auctions to “verifiable” multilateral negotiations in which the sole buyer can credibly reveal to sellers the best price offer it currently holds. We find that transaction prices are lower in verifiable multilateral negotiations than in second-price auctions, despite the two institutions’ seeming equivalence. The difference occurs because l...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economica
سال: 2014
ISSN: 0013-0427
DOI: 10.1111/ecca.12090