How a firm can induce legislators to adopt a bad policy

How a Firm Can Induce Legislators to Adopt a Bad Policy

This paper shows why a majority of legislators may vote for a policy that benefits a firm but harms all legislators. The firm may induce legislators to support the policy by suggesting that it is more likely to invest in a district whose voters or representative support the policy. In equilibrium, no one vote may be decisive, so each legislator who seeks the firm’s investment votes for the poli...

How An Agenda Setter Induces Legislators to Adopt Policies They Oppose

This paper addresses the puzzle of why redistributive legislation, which benefits a small minority, may pass with overwhelming majorities. It models a legislature in which the same agenda setter serves for two periods, showing how he can exploit a legislature (completely) in the first period by promising future benefits to legislators who support him. In equilibrium, a large majority of legisla...

Lymphotactin: how a protein can adopt two folds.

Metamorphic proteins such as lymphotactin are a notable exception of the empirical principle that structured natural proteins possess a unique three-dimensional structure. In particular, the human chemokine lymphotactin protein exists in two distinct conformations (one monomeric and one dimeric) under physiological conditions. In this work, we use a C(alpha) Go model to show how this very pecul...

Accidental Politicians: How Randomly Selected Legislators Can Improve Parliament Efficiency

We study a prototypical model of a Parliament with two Parties or two Political Coalitions and we show how the introduction of a variable percentage of randomly selected independent legislators can increase the global efficiency of a Legislature, in terms of both the number of laws passed and the average social welfare obtained. We also analytically find an ”efficiency golden rule” which allows...

How Political Science Can Contribute to Public Health: A Response to Gagnon and Colleagues