How Do Technological Artefacts Embody Moral Values?
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Can Technological Artefacts Be Moral Agents?
In this paper we discuss the hypothesis that, 'moral agency is distributed over both humans and technological artefacts', recently proposed by Peter-Paul Verbeek. We present some arguments for thinking that Verbeek is mistaken. We argue that artefacts such as bridges, word processors, or bombs can never be (part of) moral agents. After having discussed some possible responses, as well as a mode...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Philosophy & Technology
سال: 2020
ISSN: 2210-5433,2210-5441
DOI: 10.1007/s13347-020-00401-y