How monetary policy changes bank liability structure and funding cost
نویسندگان
چکیده
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Oxford Economic Papers
سال: 2019
ISSN: 0030-7653,1464-3812
DOI: 10.1093/oep/gpz058