How Opportunity Costs Decrease the Probability of War in an Incomplete Information Game
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How Opportunity Costs Decrease the Probability of War in an Incomplete Information Game
How Opportunity Costs Decrease the Probability of War in an Incomplete Information Game This paper shows that the opportunity costs resulting from economic interdependence decrease the equilibrium probability of war in an incomplete information game. This result is strongly consistent with existing empirical analyses of the inverse trade-conflict relationship, but is the opposite of the conclus...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Organization
سال: 2010
ISSN: 0020-8183,1531-5088
DOI: 10.1017/s002081830999018x