How We Might Be Able to Understand the Brain
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
How we might be able to understand the brain
Current methodologies in the neurosciences have difficulty in accounting for complex phenomena such as language, which can however be quite well characterised in phenomenological terms. This paper addresses the issue of unifying the two approaches. We typically understand complicated systems in terms of a collection of models, each characterisable in principle within a formal system, it being p...
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As sensory cells, hair cells within the mammalian inner ear convert sounds into receptor potentials when their projecting stereocilia are deflected. The organ of Corti of the cochlea contains two types of hair cell, inner and outer hair cells, which differ in function. It has been appreciated for over two decades that although inner hair cells act as the primary receptor cell for the auditory s...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Activitas Nervosa Superior
سال: 2009
ISSN: 2510-2788,1802-9698
DOI: 10.1007/bf03379924