Human rationality, environmental challenges and evolutionary game theory
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Modeling Poker Challenges by Evolutionary Game Theory
We introduce a model for studying the evolutionary dynamics of Poker. Notably, despite its wide diffusion and the raised scientific interest around it, Poker still represents an open challenge. Recent attempts for uncovering its real nature, based on statistical physics, showed that Poker in some conditions can be considered as a skill game. In addition, preliminary investigations reported a ne...
متن کاملConsequentialism, Structural Rationality, and Game Theory
Previous work on consequentialism (especially in Theory and Decision, 1988, pp. 25– 78) has provided some justification for regarding an agent’s behaviour as “structurally rational” if and only if there are subjective probabilities, and expected utility is maximized. The key axiom is that rational behaviour should be explicable as the choice of good consequences. This and other axioms will be r...
متن کاملInvestigation of Game Between Cells in Occurrence of Genetic Mutations Using Evolutionary Game Theory
In this paper, two games that play a role in creating a cancer tumor and suppression are studied using evolutionary game theory and its different modes are analyzed. The first game is the competition between a cancer cell and a healthy cell to receive food through the blood. In the second game, the interaction between the two oncogenes Ras and Myc is examined for cellular deformation
متن کاملGame Theory with Sparsity-Based Bounded Rationality∗
This paper proposes a way to enrich traditional game theory via an element of bounded rationality. It builds on previous work by the author in the context of one-agent decision problems, but extends it to several players and a generalization of the concept of Nash equilibrium. Each decision maker builds a simplified representation of the world, which includes only a partial understanding of the...
متن کاملAlgorithmic rationality: Game theory with costly computation
We develop a general game-theoretic framework for reasoning about strategic agents performing possibly costly computation. In this framework, many traditional game-theoretic results (such as the existence of a Nash equilibrium) no longer hold. Nevertheless, we can use the framework to provide psychologically appealing explanations of observed behavior in well-studied games (such as finitely rep...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Applied Studies in Agribusiness and Commerce
سال: 2014
ISSN: 1789-7874,1789-221X
DOI: 10.19041/apstract/2014/1/2